Institutional quality, culture, and norms of cooperation: Evidence from behavioral field experiments by Cassar, Alessandra et al.
821
[Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 57 (August 2014)]
 2014 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2014/5703-0023$10.00
Institutional Quality, Culture, and Norms
of Cooperation: Evidence from
Behavioral Field Experiments
Alessandra Cassar University of San Francisco
Giovanna d’Adda University of Birmingham
Pauline Grosjean University of New South Wales
Abstract
We examine the causal effect of legal institutional quality on informal norms
of cooperation and study the interaction of institutions and culture in sustaining
economic exchange. A total of 346 subjects in Italy and Kosovo played a market
game under different and randomly allocated institutional treatments, which
generated different incentives to behave honestly, preceded and followed by a
noncontractible and nonenforceable trust game. Significant increases in indi-
vidual trust and trustworthiness followed exposure to better institutions. A 1-
percentage-point reduction in the probability of facing a dishonest partner in
the market game, which is induced by the quality of legal institutions, increases
trust by 7–11 percent and trustworthiness by 13–19 percent. This suggests that
moral norms of cooperative behavior can follow improvements in formal in-
stitutional quality. Cultural origin, initial trust, and trustworthiness influence
opportunistic behavior in markets, but only in the absence of strong formal
institutions.
1. Introduction
How does the quality of institutions affect norms of good conduct, such as trust
and trustworthiness? How do values and institutions interact to sustain economic
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exchange? While there is a consensus that both good formal institutions and
high levels of societal trust are beneficial for trade and development, how they
interact and coevolve is much less clear. On the one hand, the literature suggests
a positive relationship. Theoretical models argue that well-functioning and im-
partial enforcement of contracts enhances societal trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales 2008b; Tabellini 2008). On the other hand, formal institutions, by re-
ducing the marginal returns from being trustworthy, may crowd out trust and
trustworthiness (Aghion et al. 2010). Figure 1, a scatterplot of societal levels of
trust against the quality of institutions in a cross section of countries, illustrates
the complex nature of this relationship.1 While the correlation between trust
and rule of law is positive, the correlation between trust and regulatory quality
is nonexistent or even slightly negative. Showing a causal link from institutions
to trust with happenstance data is difficult because institutions and beliefs are
codetermined (Piketty 1995)2 and coevolve under the influence of common
historical events.3,4
In this study, we use the experimental method to introduce an exogenous
variation in the quality of formal enforcement institutions and measure their
effect on moral norms of cooperation. We address two main questions. First,
we study the causal effect of formal enforcement on informal norms of trust
and trustworthiness, through their influence on cooperative behavior in markets.
Second, we shed light on how institutions and preexisting social norms interact
to sustain market efficiency and cooperation.
Our experiment consists of four parts. The first is a trust game to measure
preexisting social norms of trust and trustworthiness. The second consists of 10
rounds of a market game in which subjects chose whether to trade honestly,
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1 Figure 1 is based on data from World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://info
.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home), for 2000, and World Values Survey, WVS Wave
4 (1999–2004) (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV4.jsp).
2 For example, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) describe how beliefs about redistribution influence,
and are influenced by, actual redistribution policies. Aghion et al. (2010) state that low-trust indi-
viduals demand more regulation because they cannot rely on trust to enforce contracts. Williamson
and Kerekes (2011) discuss the strong empirical correlation between culture and formal institutions
in a cross section of countries.
3 On the persistence of historical events on formal institutions, see, among others, Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), and Dell (2011). On the persistence of
historical events on norms, attitudes, and trust, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008b), Durante
(2011), Grosjean (2011, 2014), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), and Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012).
4 Most exogenous factors that influence formal institutions might also influence trust, and vice
versa. For example, the exclusion restriction for one of the most popular instruments for institutions,
legal origins (Djankov et al. 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), is violated if
Europeans who transplanted legal traditions also transplanted aspects of beliefs or even regulatory
traditions that may influence trust. For more details about and examples of how institutions first
established by European migrants were endogenous to their cultural beliefs, see Nunn (2012).
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cheat, or stay out, in the absence of any institution. The third part involves 10
rounds of the market game under one of two formal enforcement institutional
treatments: either a partial enforcement system (PES) treatment, which repro-
duces basic features of a closed-network justice system, such as the Mafia, or an
impartial enforcement system (IES) treatment, which captures key traits of an
impartial justice system in which all agents are equal in front of the law. The
fourth part is another trust game that is identical to the first one. The different
institutional treatments in the market game generate sharply different incentives
to deviate from noncooperation (that is, cheating in the market game). More
precisely, the Nash equilibrium is to cooperate with a probability of 0 under an
enforcement system with no institutions (NoES), with a probability of 1 under
the IES treatment, and with a probability between 0 and 1 under the PES treat-
ment (mixed-strategy equilibrium). Allocation to the institutional treatment in
the experimental session is random. We rely on the initial and final one-shot
noncontractible and nonenforceable investment games to measure trust and
trustworthiness as moral norms, separate from the cooperative norms occurring
in the market game. We do so to avoid the confounding effect of reputational
concerns in repeated interactions or that of institutional incentives, which can
influence the cost of cooperation. Playing a trust game before and after our
exchange game is a key feature of our design and is motivated by our desire to
study how behavior is affected by preexisting norms, or culture, under different
institutions and how different institutions foster different dynamics in the evo-
lution of trust and trustworthiness. Relying on within-subject variation in trust
also reinforces the validity of our causal estimates and overcomes any possible
deviation from randomization in the allocation to treatment.
The experiments were conducted in the field with 169 subjects in Italy (both
in the north and in the south) and 178 subjects in Kosovo during the summer
of 2011. Our results indicate that better formal enforcement (impartial adju-
dication of tort) has a positive effect on informal norms of cooperation: trust
and trustworthiness are, respectively, 12–18 percent and 20–31 percent higher
under the IES treatment than under the PES treatment. Consistent with our
design, the impartial treatment reduces the frequency of noncooperative behavior
in the market game. In turn, Wald estimates indicate that a 1-percentage-point
reduction in the frequency of facing a noncooperative partner (a cheater) in the
trading game leads to a 7–11 percent increase in trust and a 13–19 percent
increase in trustworthiness. In Italy, the effect of impartial versus partial insti-
tutions on trustworthiness is equivalent to three-fourths of the difference between
Milan and Palermo. In Kosovo, it is equivalent to about three-fourths of the
difference between Pristina, the capital city, and Mitrovica, the scene of major
tensions during the civil war in 1999. The effect is particularly robust in Kosovo
and holds even in a first-difference specification, which measures the variation
in trust and trustworthiness within subjects across treatments.
Preexisting trust and trustworthiness are associated with less cheating, and
more generally, cultural differences captured by participants’ regional origins
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explain opportunistic behavior, but only for those who did not experience an
impartial institution in the market game. This suggests that trust may act as a
substitute for formal institutions in supporting exchange, but only in the absence
of strong formal institutions. Impartial formal institutions produce more co-
operative behavior independent of preexisting moral norms and culture.
This paper makes two contributions. First, it adds to the literature on the
origin of trust. Theoretical models see legal enforcement as having either a
positive or negative effect on trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008b; Tabellini
2008; Aghion et al. 2010). Empirically, recent papers have pointed to a positive
relationship between institutional quality and trust on the basis of evidence that
societal trust is higher today in regions that experienced good-quality institutions
in the past (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008a; Tabellini 2010; Grosjean 2011).
A possible limitation to causal identification in these studies is that historical
institutions were themselves the outcome of societal trust, and both have persisted
until today. By randomly allocating our subjects to different institutional envi-
ronments, we are able to identify a positive causal effect of institutions. Our
findings suggest that trust and trustworthiness can develop as a by-product of
better formal institutional quality.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the role of culture and its interaction
with formal institutions in determining opportunistic behavior in markets and
market efficiency. By running our experiment in regions with different levels of
trust, we can observe how behavior under each exogenously imposed institution
varies across cultures. Running experiments in the field and the selection of our
experimental sites are both driven by a desire to capture substantial cultural
differences and thereby enhance external validity of our findings. We ran sessions
in northern Italy, which is characterized by good formal institutions and high
levels of trust; in Sicily, which is characterized in theory by the same formal
institutions but in practice by all-too-familiar partial, closed-network contract
enforcement institutions and low levels of trust; and in Kosovo, which is char-
acterized by weak formal institutions and relatively high levels of trust.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our main hypothesis in
light of the empirical and theoretical literature on the coevolution of social norms
and institutions and their influence on economic exchange. Section 3 describes
the experiment. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5
analyzes the effect of legal institutions on trust and trustworthiness. Section 6
addresses the role of preexisting norms on market behavior and efficiency and
their interaction with institutional quality. Section 7 concludes. The online ap-
pendixes present the theoretical solution to the trading game, additional results
and descriptive statistics, and the experimental instructions.
2. Background and Hypotheses
A fundamental proposition in economics is that markets achieve 100 percent
efficiency, that is, the maximization of possible benefits from trade for buyers
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and sellers. This, however, is based on the hypothesis of frictionless markets. On
the contrary, actual markets face many trading frictions since contracts are not
always perfectly or costlessly enforceable. In this case, the fear of dealing with
a cheating partner might drive down market opportunities and surplus. Such
cheating frictions present formidable obstacles not just in places where formal
contract enforcement institutions are weak, as in markets of the ancient and
medieval world (Greif 1993) and in many developing economies (Fafchamps
2004, 2006), but also in economically advanced countries with good enforcement
institutions, since it is rarely possible to specify by contract all dimensions of
an economic transaction.
Interpersonal networks based on kinship and reputation have been recognized
as playing an important role in enforcing trade and promoting cooperation
(Fafchamps and Minten 2001; Greif 2006).5 However, the very interpersonal
nature of these institutions limits the scope of exchange and may reduce efficiency
by diverting trade to better connected but less efficient traders (Fafchamps 2002,
2004; Kuran and Lustig 2012). Impartial institutions and the rule of law are
deemed to become necessary to sustain large-scale impersonal trade (North 1991;
Dixit 2004). Nevertheless, the observation that trade can flourish when contracts
are not enforceable, because of either their incomplete nature or the absence of
institutions, has revived interest in the positive role of social norms and of trust
and trustworthiness in particular (Fafchamps 2006). Although there is a clear
consensus in the literature that both good-quality institutions and high levels of
trust promote trade, cooperation, and development,6 the question of how in-
stitutions and social norms interact and coevolve is much less clear.
The literature offers many definitions of trust, depending on the specific con-
text and content of the study. Here we follow Gambetta (2000) and define trust
as “the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent
or group of agents will perform a particular action.” In our experimental context,
trust is the expectation that another subject will return at least as much as he
was given or more, sharing some of the gains. So when discussing trust and
trustworthiness as moral norms, we refer to these noncontractible expectations
and behaviors, distinguished from the ones that occur in contractible market
environments. The literature has tried to distinguish between the two. In the
theoretical model of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008b), trust is based on
5 In support of this hypothesis, Cassar, Friedman, and Schneider (2009) provide evidence based
on laboratory market experiments showing that reputation-based networks significantly reduce cheat-
ing and increase efficiency with respect to a baseline of completely anonymous interactions in the
absence of legal enforcement institutions; but even if in theory they could achieve 100 percent
efficiency, in practice they always fail to do so.
6 The literature is too large to be adequately reflected here. For the role of formal and informal
institutions in supporting trade, see Fafchamps (2006), Greif (2006), North (1991), and Dixit (2004).
For the role of formal institutions in promoting growth and development, see Rodrik, Subramanian,
and Trebbi (2004), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), and Dell (2011). For the role of trust
in promoting cooperation, development, and growth, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006, 2008a,
2008b, 2009), Tabellini (2008, 2010), and Algan and Cahuc (2010).
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culturally transmitted beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and on real experi-
ences of cooperation. Societies can be trapped in an equilibrium of mistrust if
the net benefits from cooperation are not sufficiently high to induce people to
experience cooperation and update the low prior assumptions they may hold
on others’ trustworthiness. Institutions play a role in determining the net benefits
resulting from cooperation. Shocks to the quality of institutions, if capable of
inducing significant increases in cooperation, may shift societies to a cooperative
equilibrium, even when the shock is temporary.
Tabellini (2008) considers a model in which culturally transmitted values
enhance the probability of cooperation. This model distinguishes between lo-
calized trust, which is based on interpersonal relationships, and generalized trust,
which can sustain exchange with anonymous others. Only improvements in
impartial enforcement are capable of crowding in generalized trust, while im-
provements in local enforcement have an opposite effect by reducing the relative
return from trading with anonymous versus local partners. This suggests a com-
plementarity between impartial contracting institutions and societal norms of
generalized trust and trustworthiness.
The special role of impartial enforcement institutions has also been highlighted
in the political science and sociology literature. Among the first, Rothstein and
Stolle (2008) find that the specific institutions that explain variation in societal
trust across countries are the supposedly impartial enforcement institutions, such
as the legal system and the police, rather than the more partisan political and
representational institutions. Among sociological works, Hruschka (2010) shows
that adherence to impartial norms of conduct is correlated with the quality and
impartiality of legal enforcement institutions.7
By contrast, the negative relationship in Tabellini (2008) between local, as
opposed to impartial, enforcement and generalized trust is reminiscent of a
possible negative effect of legal enforcement on trust, which has been discussed
elsewhere in the literature. Crowding out may occur because better external
enforcement weakens reputational incentives (McMillan and Woodruff 2000)
and decreases the returns to being trustworthy (Bohnet, Frey, and Huck 2001;
Jackson 2011). Under perfect (or close enough) contract enforcement, behavior
is entirely dictated by the perspective of monetary punishment, so there is no
return to honesty and trust may be crowded out.
In short, the theoretical literature discusses two countervailing effects of en-
forcement institutions on social norms, in which trust is crowded either in or
out by better legal enforcement. Empirically, a number of papers find evidence
that good-quality historical institutions have a long-lasting positive effect on
trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008a; Tabellini 2010; Grosjean 2011). How-
ever, a possible limitation to causal identification in these studies is that historical
7 This is measured through answers to a survey question known as Passengers’ Dilemma, which
asks about respondents’ willingness to lie to the police to save a friend from jail in a hypothetical
situation.
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institutions were themselves the outcome of societal trust, which has persisted
until today. Another limitation emanates from recent evidence that good his-
torical institutions can persist at a very local level. Identification in Guiso, Sap-
ienza, and Zingales (2008a), Tabellini (2010), and Grosjean (2011) is based on
the assumption that formal institutions are constant in a given country, so
variations in trust can be attributed to culturally transmitted social norms and
not to contemporaneous institutional quality. However, recent evidence from
Becker, Hainz, and Woessman (2011) shows that there is less corruption in local
courts and among police in regions of a given country that were part of the
Habsburg Empire. If both historical and contemporaneous local institutions are
different, observed trust may not necessarily be reflective of cultural norms
inherited from historical institutions but rather may be justified by higher in-
stitutional quality today.
Beyond exploring the effect of institutions on trust, we are also interested in
how preexisting trust, or more generally culture, influences the effectiveness of
institutions. Fisman and Miguel (2007), in a study of parking violations com-
mitted by diplomats stationed in New York, find that cultural origins matter in
determining behavior in the absence of formal enforcement, but such an effect
disappears very rapidly once enforcement is imposed. With immunity, diplomats
from countries with high levels of corruption committed more parking infrac-
tions than those from less corrupt countries, but infractions were reduced dra-
matically once immunity was removed.8
In sum, theoretical works and empirical evidence suggest two testable hy-
potheses that are addressed in this paper. First, impartial institutions in a market
environment have a positive effect on nonmarket moral norms such as trust and
trustworthiness. Second, although preexisting culture may be important at in-
termediate levels of institutional development, it ceases to play any role in co-
operative behavior in markets once good impartial institutions are in place.
One challenge to laboratory studies of the evolution of trust is the velocity
with which social norms change. The theoretical models reviewed above con-
ceptualize trust as an inherited cultural variable that exhibits remarkable per-
sistence over time. The inherited component of trust and the implication that
trust is slow to change have been supported by several empirical studies (Butler,
Giuliano, and Guiso 2012; Durante 2011; Grosjean 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon
2011). However, in certain contexts, rapid changes in trust and norms of good
conduct are shown to occur. For example, variations in trust are observed as
migrants adapt to their new environment (Algan and Cahuc 2010) or after
residents experience violence during a civil war (Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo
2013; Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013). Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990)
show that an exogenous manipulation of perceived social norms about littering
8 Similarly, Grosjean (2011) finds that a culture of violence brought to the United States by Scots-
Irish and Scottish Highlander settlers in the 18th century persisted only where formal enforcement
institutions were absent.
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has an immediate effect on littering behavior. The broken-windows theory in
sociology is based precisely on the idea, supported by empirical evidence (Holden
2008; Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg 2008), that pro- (or anti-)social behavior can
easily be triggered by small, local changes in disorder. Rand et al.’s (2013) social
heuristics hypothesis suggests precisely that intuition can trigger internalized
norms of cooperation.
3. Experimental Design
Each experimental session comprised four parts that were followed by a survey.
These parts included an initial trust game (or investment game) in which subjects
played both the part of the trustor and that of the trustee (part 1), 10 rounds
(days) of trading in the market game under NoES (part 2), 10 rounds of trading
under either PES or IES (part 3), and a final trust game (part 4), for a total of
24 decisions per subject.
3.1. Trust Game
To measure initial and final levels of trust and trustworthiness as moral social
norms, we use a modification of the standard protocol of the investment game
used by Berg, McCabe, and Dickhaut (1995). In this game, subjects have the
ability to invest by sending money to an anonymous experimental partner. The
amount of money sent is then multiplied by 3 before reaching the partner. It is
then the partner’s turn to decide how much of the received amount to return
to the original investor. By considering the amounts that subjects invest and
then return, we can determine to what extent subjects trust others and how
trustworthy they are. In our version, subjects played both the role of sender and
that of receiver.
We used the strategy method (in which receivers have to decide how much
to send back to the sender under all possible amounts that they could have
received) to prevent players from knowing anything about fellow subjects’ trust
and reciprocity, so as to limit the dependency between the specific trust expe-
rienced in the first game and the following exchange games. Senders could choose
to invest any amount between i0 and i10, while receivers had to decide how
much they would send back for each possible amount that they could receive,
ranging from a minimum of i0 to a maximum of i30. The amount sent by the
sender (X) is considered a signal of trust because larger amounts sent translate
into larger amounts that the receiver has to divide. By sending larger amounts,
the sender’s best possible payoff from the game increases, but at the same time
her worst-case payoff from the game decreases relative to the scenario in which
she sends nothing at all. The amount sent back by the receiver is considered a
measure of trustworthiness or reciprocity. If one of these four decisions (as sender
or receiver in either part 1 or part 4) was randomly drawn to be the one to be
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Table 1
Payoff Matrix for Cheating in an Enforcement
System with No Institutions
No Cheat Cheat Out
No cheat 20, 20 0, 30 1, 1
Cheat 30, 0 10, 10 1, 1
Out 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1
paid, the experimenter randomly matched subjects into pairs and computed
their profits depending on the actual partners’ choices.
3.2. Market Game
The central part of the experiment consists of playing a market game under
different institutional treatments. The first 10 rounds of trading are conducted
under a regime with no institutions. The second 10 rounds are conducted under
regimes with either partial or impartial institutions, depending on the randomly
selected treatment for that session.
3.2.1. Enforcement System with No Institutions
The basic framework consists of a trading game in which 8–10 players decide
whether or not to cheat an anonymous counterparty, or not to trade at all, for
each one of 10 days during which trading partners change each day. In practice,
cheating in markets happens when, for example, a buyer does not pay, a check
bounces, or a seller deliver a lower quality or defective good. In the experiment,
players trade an abstract good, so we do not go into details, and we simply ask
them to either cheat, not cheat, or stay out of trade. Table 1 displays the pa-
rameters chosen for the baseline game.
This treatment of the market game reproduces the features of a Prisoners’
Dilemma. Each individual has a private incentive to cheat. However, if everyone
follows the same rationale, the exchange generates lower levels of social welfare.
Maximum social welfare and efficiency (a total surplus of 40, equally split between
traders) are attainable only when both parties do not cheat. Given our payoffs,
we find two equilibria, [cheat, cheat] and [out, out], with payoff dominated by
the former. As long as the payoff from trading and cheating is higher than the
payoff from opting out, we expect everyone to participate in equilibrium and
cheat. In this case, the equilibrium quantity would be 1 per couple of players,
and the total surplus would be 10 per player. Such an outcome is in stark contrast
to the equilibrium that would be obtained under perfect and costless enforce-
ment: as long as the payoff from trading is higher than the payoff from opting
out, under perfect enforcement everyone would trade in equilibrium, with an
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equilibrium quantity of 1 per couple of players and a total surplus of 20 per
player per day.9
Between the two benchmarks of perfectly running institutions or a complete
lack of an enforcing system, we can investigate the effects of different institutions.
An experiment is not expected to reflect all aspects of the real world but rather
just what one thinks are the most important features for understanding the issue
of interest. In our case, we cannot model all the dimensions of a contract
enforcement institution, but we want to generate substantial variation in devi-
ations from cooperation while focusing on one aspect in particular that has been
the focus of an important literature (see Section 2): partial versus impartial
administration of justice.
3.2.2. Partial Enforcement System
In this treatment, subjects can insure themselves against being cheated on by
others by buying protection against a cheating counterparty. Purchasing pro-
tection costs i5, which has to be paid regardless of whether such protection is
used later. If a player buys protection and is cheated, the cheater not only loses
all she has gained by cheating but also is punished. This payoff scheme is designed
to mimic what happens when a partial, closed-network institution, such as the
Mafia, is in charge of enforcing contracts. Typically in these settings, individuals
who are determined to participate in economic activities may be induced to pay
for protection regardless of whether or not they will require the services of the
local boss. In return, they are insured against the claims, rightful or not, of
competitors and commercial partners. There is always the incentive, though,
either not to pay the protection fee or to cheat in hopes that the partner is not
protected. This is reflected in the payoff matrix of the game (see the online
appendix).
Every trading day, subjects have to decide whether or not they want to buy
protection and whether they want to trade honestly, cheat, or stay out, before
knowing the choice of their trading partner for that day. In our instructions, we
explain to the subjects each possible decision, presenting all four of the following
possible scenarios (in addition to the option of staying out): neither subject has
protection, only the subject has protection, only the partner has protection, or
both have protection. When neither side purchases protection, the payoff struc-
ture is the same as in NoES. When both parties buy protection, the final result
depends on whether none, one, or both cheated. Traders who do not cheat earn
i15 (i20 from honest exchange, minus the i5 payment to purchase protection).
If both traders cheat, then the protection agency makes sure that exchange does
follow through and imposes an additional cost of i3 as punishment for cheating;
therefore, both traders end up with a payoff of i12 (i20 from an honest exchange,
9 For example, the continuous double auction, which is usually run with the underlying assumption
that contracts are perfectly and costlessly enforceable, always delivers 100 percent efficiency (Cassar,
Friedman, and Schneider 2009).
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minus the i5 payment to purchase protection, minus i3 as punishment for
cheating). When both parties have protection and one cheats while the other
does not, the one who does not cheat can get the contract enforced anyway, so
she still earns i15, while the cheating party, as before, gets i12. Last is the case
in which only one trader buys protection. The trader who buys protection and
does not cheat gets i15 no matter what the partner does (i20 from an honest
exchange minus the i5 payment to purchase protection). The partner receives
i20 if she does not cheat or loses i3 if caught cheating. If the trader cheats, she
earns i25 (i30 from cheating minus i5 to purchase protection) no matter what
the partner does, since the protection agency will protect her no matter what.
The nonprotected trader will instead earn i0 if he does not cheat or lose i3 if
he cheats. As in the previous cases, staying out of the market yields a profit of
i1. A payoff matrix and a full description of the solution to this game are provided
in the online appendix.
The only pure-strategies equilibrium in this game is for both players to stay
out. However, the game has many equilibria in mixed strategies in which players
can randomize between the different strategies, with the exception of [buying
protection, stay out], which is a purely dominated strategy. This outcome is
consistent with our desire to generate an equilibrium in which the probability
of cheating is between 0 and 1. Also, in the presence of multiple equilibria,
individual beliefs about the probability of being cheated will determine the spe-
cific strategy played by each subject. Therefore, we expect preexisting levels of
trust to influence the outcomes of the game in the field.
3.2.3. Impartial Enforcement System
For this treatment, we model an impartial judicial system as an institution in
which each subject has the option of taking a cheating partner to court. The
court then enforces order: whoever cheats has to pay the full price plus a fine,
and whoever is cheated receives the full amount minus a court fee. This treatment
aims to reproduce the trade-offs faced by citizens when an impartial justice
system is used: going to court is an option open to everyone but is still voluntary;
it is moderately costly, but when used, it restores the outcomes of honest market
exchanges.
As with the PES treatment, subjects have to decide at the beginning of each
trading day whether they want to have the option of taking a cheating partner
to court and whether they want to trade honestly, cheat, or stay out, before they
know the choice of their trading partner. Selecting this option is free. A small
fee is required only when someone actually takes a cheater to court. For simplicity,
we elicit this decision before the behavior of the counterparty is revealed, much
like in the strategy method. Pairs in which neither side wants to take the coun-
terparty to court face the same payoffs as in the NoES case. On the contrary,
when a subject decides to take a cheating trading partner to court, the court
forces the cheating party to trade honestly and pay a fine of i5. Going to court
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costs i2, which is deducted from subjects’ profit for the day only when courts
are involved in solving the dispute. When neither party cheats, each trader still
receives a payoff of i20. In case a trader who has been cheated has selected to
go to court, she earns i18 if she did not cheat (the honest-exchange payoff of
i20 minus i2 for taking the counterparty to court) or i13 if she also cheated
(the honest-exchange payoff of i20, minus i2 for taking the counterparty to
court, minus a fine of i5 for having cheated as well). Last, when a subject decides
not to go to court but her partner does, her payoff is still i20 if nobody cheated,
i13 if she cheated, or i0 if her partner cheated. Staying out of the market, either
by opting out or by being matched with a subject that opts out, still yields i1.
A full-payoff matrix for this game is provided in the online appendix.
In this treatment, for both partners, going to court and trading honestly is a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is, however, not unique. The case in which
both players stay out is also a Nash equilibrium, with payoff dominated by the
first one. As in the NoES case, we expect individuals to play the payoff-dominant
Nash equilibrium.
There are two crucial differences between the IES and the PES treatments.
The first is impartiality of enforcement. The court system in the IES treatment
is impartial: all the cheaters are punished in the court system, even if they
themselves initiated the process by taking a cheater to court. Under PES, a cheater
who has private protection can cheat and not only get away with it but also get
her partner to pay without herself having to pay, if the partner does not have
protection. The second difference between our institutional treatments lies in
the level of cooperation that they induce. Subjects are expected to cheat with a
probability of 1 in equilibrium under the NoES treatment, with a probability of
0 under the IES treatment, and with a probability between 0 and 1 under the
PES treatment. The exogenous variation in the probability of cheating introduced
in the experiment is crucial for our analysis of treatment effects on trust and
trustworthiness.
It is important to notice that our choice of treatment terminology (partial or
impartial) alludes only to a specific form of partiality: one based on receiving
justice only after having paid an upfront payment. Outside our experimental
environment, the term “partiality” in relation to a judicial system may suggest
a much bigger picture of discrimination based on race, gender, and status, in
addition to the one observed in Mafia-type systems of private protection. Here,
we narrow the definitions of partial and impartial to the specific treatment
institutions defined above. For this work, the most important discriminating
feature is that in one system nobody can be excluded from receiving a just
adjudication of tort, while in the other system only those who paid up front are
entitled. This distinction implies that, in our experimental design, partial and
impartial enforcement mechanisms rely on the difference between up-front sunk
costs (conditional enforcement system) and costs that can be made contingent
on being cheated (unconditional enforcement system). In our choice of study
design, these are necessary features of the two enforcement systems.
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A PES treatment, as the Mafia type, runs on the premise that smooth trans-
actions can be delivered after the collection of an up-front payment (known as
il pizzo). Protection is exclusionary, only for the people who pay. We do not
think that a Mafia-style system that would require payment ex post is conceivable
(or realistic): it is precisely the objective of this system to make sure that trades
run smoothly, without cheating incidents. If they were to be paid ex post, mem-
bers of the organization would have an interest in increasing the amount of
incidents, so their business would be limited to revenge or vendetta instead
(Gambetta 1996).
By contrast, an impartial court system is characterized by the impossibility of
excluding anybody from accessing the enforcement system and by the absence
of discretionary sunk costs. Additional individual costs are conditional on using
the system. Of course, a court system also comes with sunk costs, such as paying
for judges, but given the fungibility of public funds, we do not think such costs
would directly enter individual decision making in the market game that we
consider.10
One could conceive two other treatments—an IES with up-front cost and a
PES with costs contingent on being cheated. These treatments, however, would
be interesting only from a theoretical perspective.
3.3. Experimental Protocol
The games were played with paper and pencil so that we could reach our
targeted subject pool in the field. Each point was equivalent to i1 at both study
sites.11 After the experimenters read each part of the instructions aloud and
explained the various possible scenarios, the subjects had to go through a set of
comprehension questions before playing the actual games. Subjects were ran-
domly and anonymously rematched for each of the 24 decisions that they had
to make.12 It was stressed during the reading of the instructions that each choice
that the subjects had to make had the same probability of being selected for
payment. On average, each session lasted about 2 hours.
Subjects were not given any information ahead of time about the nature or
the sequence of the tasks. They knew the total number of tasks, but no details
were given until the instructions for the corresponding stage of the experiment
were handed out. Trust game results in part 1 were not revealed to the players,
unless that first activity was the one actually selected for payment at the end of
the session. The fact that participants knew the total number of activities in the
10 Another way to look at the differential effect of up-front versus conditional payments is to see
it not just in connection with the partiality or impartiality of a system but also in its relation to
individual risk preferences. Yet we never find risk preferences to affect our results in a significant
way. This provides comforting evidence that this distinction in risk may play only a minor role.
11 Despite differences in gross domestic product per capita, to recruit and incentivize subjects we
needed to use the same payoffs in Kosovo as in Italy, given the high cost of living in Kosovo.
12 A computer program displayed pairs of random numbers reproducing participants’ identity
cards, which were used to determine random matching into pairs in this as well as in the other tasks
in the experiment. The program was set so that repetition of the same pairs was kept to a minimum.
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experiment implies that they were aware, at the time of playing the second trust
game, that they were completing the final task of the session. This end-game
feature stacks the deck against us finding a significant difference in the change
of trust or trustworthiness after the different treatments. The fact that we still
find significant differences means that our results are lower bounds.
Each session was randomly assigned one of the two treatments (either IES or
PES), in addition to the NoES treatment administered to everyone. In the market
games, at the beginning of each round, participants were given a sheet of paper
with one line for each of the 10 trading days. Each line was divided into two
parts. On the left side, subjects had to mark their choices (by checking the
corresponding boxes) concerning eventual use of the court system or of the
protection and their trading strategy. On the right side, similar boxes were used
by the experimenter to report, at the end of each day, the decisions of the trading
partner and the resulting profit. Partners were randomly and anonymously re-
matched each day by the experimenter, who also computed the profits on the
basis of the relevant payoff matrix. Subjects were constantly reminded that,
should one of these trading days be the one selected for payment, they would
incur the profits and losses that occurred that day.
When all decision sheets were collected, the experimenter asked one of the
subjects to draw a number from a hat. The numbers ranged from 1 to 24,
equaling the total number of decisions made during the experiment. The number
determined the decision to be implemented for payout. This payout would then
be added or subtracted to the attendance fee (i10). Final earnings were always
positive. While the assistants calculated the payments, participants filled out a
survey. The survey featured basic demographic and socioeconomic questions, as
well as questions about beliefs and behaviors related to the social preferences
and behaviors elicited during the experiment. The survey included questions
about trust in institutions and people, experiences of economic exchanges, bor-
rowing, seeking help in different situations, and exposure to illicit activities.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.1. Sample Size and Selection of Subjects
We ran 37 experimental sessions: 19 in Italy (169 subjects) and 18 in Kosovo
(178 subjects). The average number of participants in each session was 9.56
(minimum, seven; maximum, 12).13 The majority of sessions had either 10 (58
percent of sessions) or eight participants (25 percent of sessions).
In Italy, subjects were recruited with the help of producers’ and workers’
associations in three different regions: Lombardy, Liguria, and Sicily. Each as-
sociation sent to its members the invitation to participate in an economic study,
13 One session had seven participants because one person left after the first trust game. The
experimenter filled out the subject’s decision sheet using random choices generated by the computer.
Other participants in the session were aware of this.
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specifying its duration and the range of possible gains. When enough people
had volunteered, the time and place for the session was agreed on. Sessions
usually took place in the offices of the association. This choice of recruitment
system answered two basic needs. The first was a need to overcome the logistical
challenges of recruiting people for 2-hour sessions in the middle of the summer:
associations had the network and capacity to bring together enough members
to allow us to conduct our sessions. Second, because one of the objectives of
this study was to assess how the preferences and behavior we observe in the
experiment generalize to economically relevant choices in the real world, workers’
and producers’ associations gave us access to a sample of business owners and
employees from different sectors who regularly have to make decisions in their
jobs similar to the ones they faced in the experiment.
In Kosovo, participants were recruited at random using paper invitations.
Invitations were dropped off at every fifth doorway in both rural and urban
areas of 10 different locations.
Both the survey instrument and the instructions for the experiment were
translated into local languages using a double-translation procedure to ensure
consistency across sites. Nevertheless, to account for differences in recruitment
procedures between the two countries, all specifications include country fixed
effects in the regression analysis.
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics reflecting the sociodemographic and economic back-
grounds of our subject pool are presented in Table 2. The objective of collecting
such information was to investigate potential heterogeneous effects of experi-
mental treatments but also to check the validity of the randomized allocation
procedure of the different experimental treatments. Apart from a higher pro-
portion of students in the IES treatment (27 versus 14 percent in the PES
treatment; t-statistic of 3.1) and a larger average household size in the PES
treatments (4.7 versus 4.2 in the IES treatment; t-statistic of 1.9), covariates were
well balanced across the experimental treatments.14 Despite randomizing the
assignment of treatments to sessions, initial trust and trustworthiness turned out
to be significantly higher in the IES treatment than in the PES treatment. Trust
was measured as the amount sent, and trustworthiness was measured as the
average amount returned as a percentage of the amount sent, averaged over all
the possible amounts sent (elicited using the strategy method). Subjects assigned
to the PES and IES treatments sent, on average, i5.2 and i5.9 (t-statistic of 2.76)
and returned, on average, 48 and 58 percent (t-statistic of 4.56), respectively.
Such differences are entirely driven by Kosovo (t-statistics of 3.07 and .82 in
Kosovo and Italy, respectively). They certainly represent a concern for our iden-
tification strategy, which we address by controlling for initial trust and trust-
14 Separate data for Kosovo and northern and southern Italy are presented in the online appendix.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for the Sociodemographic and Economic Backgrounds of the Participants
All PES IES
PES  IES
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD (t-Statistic)
Amount sent in TG1 (i) 346 5.55 2.39 5.24 2.29 5.94 2.47 2.76
Amount sent in TG2 (i) 346 5.92 2.62 5.43 2.44 6.51 2.72 3.87
Amount Sent TG2  TG1 (i) 346 .36 2.3 .2 2.09 .57 2.53 1.49
Percentage returned in TG1 346 52.70 20.23 48.37 17.99 58.06 21.58 4.56
Percentage returned in TG2 346 51.63 28.24 44.64 20.92 60.25 33.34 5.31
Percentage Returned TG2  TG1 346 1.11 23.39 3.80 14.70 2.19 30.64 2.39
Probability of a partner cheating 346 3.54 2.41 4.27 2.43 2.63 2.06 6.7
Gender (equals one if male) 346 .66 .47 .66 .48 .66 .47 .09
Age (years) 342 36.14 14.94 35.81 14.45 36.56 15.56 .46
Number of children 342 1.01 1.89 1.11 2.14 .88 1.51 1.11
Household size 339 4.47 2.34 4.68 2.45 4.20 2.18 1.89
Marital status:
Married 342 .45 .50 .48 .50 .41 .49 1.29
Separated 342 .04 .19 .05 .21 .03 .16 1.03
Widowed 342 .01 .11 .01 .10 .01 .11 .21
Single 342 .50 .50 .46 .50 .55 .50 1.63
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Employment status:
Employee or self-employed 344 .50 .50 .54 .50 .46 .50 1.51
Student 344 .20 .40 .14 .35 .27 .45 3.1
Business owner 345 .34 .48 .34 .48 .34 .48 .00
Unemployed 344 .17 .38 .20 .40 .14 .35 1.34
Inactive or other 344 .12 .33 .12 .33 .12 .33 .11
Education level:
Primary or secondary 344 .08 .26 .09 .29 .06 .23 1.11
High school 344 .51 .50 .49 .50 .52 .50 .56
Post high school 344 .23 .42 .25 .44 .19 .40 1.33
Graduate education 344 .19 .39 .16 .37 .23 .42 1.45
Household income (i per capita) 333 54 92 59 107 48 70 1.05
Socioeconomic status 341 4.61 1.85 4.66 1.73 4.55 2.01 .53
Risky lottery choice 344 .15 .36 .16 .36 .15 .36 .17
Note. The probability of partners cheating is calculated as [number of cheating partners/(number of participants # trading days in treatment round)] # 100. For
socioeconomic status, 1 p poorest and 10 p richest. PES p partial enforcement system; IES p impartial enforcement system; TG1 p first trust game; TG2 p
second trust game.
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worthiness in all regressions described below and by presenting results in first
differences.
Initial trust and trustworthiness differ across countries. Subjects in Kosovo
and Italy sent, on average, i5.6 and i5.4 and returned, on average, 55 and 50
percent, respectively. These differences are statistically significant.15 Our small
sample size makes it impossible to detect significant within-country differences.
In particular, subjects from southern Italy appear to be less trusting and more
trustworthy than those from the north, but these differences are not statistically
significant. For this reason, in what follows, we show results disaggregated by
country only.
Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables are presented in Figures 2–6.
Figure 2A displays the average amount sent—that is, trust in the final trust game
after each of the two different institutional treatments, both for the whole sample
and for each country separately; spikes represent the standard error of the mean.
Figure 3 shows similar results for trustworthiness: on average, participants sent
i6.5 and i5.4 and returned 60 and 45 percent of the amount received, respec-
tively, in the games using the IES and PES treatments. The amounts sent and
the percentages returned in the second trust game were higher after the IES
treatment than after the the PES treatment (t-statistics of 3.87 and 5.31, re-
spectively). The differences are particularly large in Kosovo. Figure 2B presents
the average individual increase in amounts sent between the two trust games,
before and after the experimental institutional treatment. Similarly, Figure 3B
presents the average individual difference in the percentage returned between
the two trust games. Taking first differences within individuals eliminates in-
dividual heterogeneity and any departure from perfect randomization across
treatments. Trust increases after both treatments, but it increases much more so
in the IES treatment: the average difference in the amount sent is i.6 and i.2
after the IES and PES treatments, respectively. According to a simple t-test, the
difference is statistically significant (t p 1.49). For trustworthiness, the PES
treatment actually led to a 3.8-percentage-point decrease in the average per-
centage returned, whereas the IES treatment led to a 2.2-percentage-point in-
crease, a difference that is statistically significant according to a simple t-test (t
p 2.39). As a result, trustworthiness is greater under the IES treatment than
under the PES treatment, and the difference is statistically significant overall in
Italy and in Kosovo (t-statistics of 5.31, 2.75, and 5.14, respectively).
The remaining figures display the average measures (and standard errors of
the mean, represented by spikes) of individual behavior and market efficiency
in the market game: cheating behavior (Figure 4), market participation decisions
(Figure 5), and traders’ total individual profits (Figure 6) under the NoES, PES,
and IES situations. Figures in the online appendix show the evolution of cheating,
opting out, and trading profits throughout the game under the three treatments.
Levels of market participation and profits are highest and cheating is least com-
15 The t-statistics are 1.67 and 2.29, respectively.
Figure 2. Trust across treatments: (A) behavior in trust game 2 and (B) first-difference
averages.
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Figure 3. Trustworthiness across treatments: (A) behavior in trust game 2 and (B) first-
difference averages.
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Figure 4. Cheating in the trade game: averages
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Figure 5. Opting out of trade in the trade game: averages
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Figure 6. Trading profits in the trade game: averages
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mon under the IES treatment. On average, participants opt out of trade for 1
trading day per round in the NoES treatment, .6 of a trading day per round in
the PES treatment, and .4 of a trading day per round in the IES treatment. They
cheat 3.61 times in 10 rounds under the NoES, 3.65 times under PES, and only
2.20 under IES. Total profits over the 10 rounds are, on average, i131, i121,
and i167 in the NoES, PES, and IES treatments, respectively. A direct comparison
of profit across treatments warrants caution: in PES, subjects have to prepay the
fee of i5 for ensuring private protection, and this further reduces profits. The
quality of contract enforcement institutions seems to have a nonmonotonic effect
on cheating behavior and market efficiency. In Kosovo, cheating is actually more
frequent under PES than under NoES (4.3 and 3.6 times over the 10 rounds,
respectively). As a result, total surplus is not higher under PES than under NoES:
total profits are, on average, i123 and i138 in the PES and NoES treatments,
respectively. On the contrary, in Italy cheating is less frequent under PES than
under NoES (2.97 and 3.62 times over the 10 rounds, respectively), yet profits
remain lower. We next turn to regression analysis to test the statistical significance
and robustness of these results.
5. The Causal Effect of Institutions on Trust
Here we test through regression analysis our first hypothesis: impartial contract
enforcement institutions in markets lead to higher levels of trust and trustwor-
thiness as moral norms (in noncontractible environments) than do partial in-
stitutions, through their effect on cooperative behavior in markets. Descriptive
evidence in Section 4 indicates that our institutional treatments were successful
in generating the predicted changes. Here we first show the effect of our insti-
tutional treatments on trust and trustworthiness in a reduced-form regression
framework. Second, we quantify the effect of a reduction in the frequency of
noncooperation on trust and trustworthiness with a Wald estimate.
5.1. Empirical Specification
Since allocation to treatment is random, the causal effect of institutional treat-
ment on trust and trustworthiness is obtained by comparing across treatment
groups the average amounts sent and returned, respectively, in the second trust
game. We control for country fixed effects to take into account any difference
in the implementation of the experiment in the different countries. All regressions
also control for behavior in the first trust game to control for differences in
initial trust and trustworthiness. For robustness, we present additional specifi-
cations to show that our results are robust to the inclusion of additional indi-
vidual controls. We estimate the following regression:
T p a bD gT  cC dX   , (1)2i 1i i i
where T2i and T1i denote the behavior (either trust or trustworthiness) of in-
dividual i in the second and first trust games, respectively. Dummy variable D
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captures the institutional treatment and takes a value of one for the IES treatment
and zero for the PES treatment. The term C is a country dummy. The term Xi
is a vector of individual controls, such as age, gender, marital status, education
level, individual income, employment status, and an individual estimate of risk
aversion measured by a survey question about a lottery choice between a safe
and a risky option. We present results with and without this set of individual
controls.
For robustness, we also estimate the model in first differences. The first-
difference model estimates the variation of trust and trustworthiness within
individuals as a function of the experimental treatment. For this specification,
we estimate the model:
T  T p a bD  . (2)2i 1i i
The term b is the causal effect of the treatment: it estimates the differential
variation within subjects, across treatments, and in trust and trustworthiness
levels between period 1, before the treatment is administered, and period 2, after
the treatment is administered.16
Throughout our tables, in the regressions using the full sample, we report
robust standard errors as well as robust standard errors clustered at the session
level to take into account any potential correlation among individual errors of
participants in the same session (37 clusters). Regressions run on individual
country or treatment subsamples use robust standard errors, given the lower
number of clusters.
5.2. Reduced-Form Results
Regression results are presented in Table 3. Columns 1–3 display results for
the pooled sample when the dependent variable is the amount sent by the first
player in the final trust game (our measure of trust). Columns 7–9 display
regression results for the percentage returned by the second player (averaged
over all the possible amounts received elicited via the strategy method) in the
final trust game (our measure of trustworthiness). Columns 5, 6, 11, and 12
report the results of similar specifications using the country subsamples data for
the same dependent variables. For each measure and in each sample, results are
presented without and with individual controls.
As anticipated by the uncontrolled tests on means, the IES treatment had a
positive, statistically significant, and robust effect on both the amount sent and
the percentage returned in the final trust game, compared with the PES treatment.
The effect of treatment on trustworthiness is further decomposed to reveal that
impartial enforcement positively affects both unconditional altruism and reci-
16 This model eliminates any potential unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level and any
departure from perfect randomization across treatments.
Table 3
Trust and Trustworthiness Results from Ordinary Least Squares Regressions
Amount Sent Percentage Returned
Pooled Sample Pooled Sample
TG2
TG2  TG1 Italy Kosovo
TG2
TG2  TG1 Italy Kosovo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
IES 1.08** .64** .71** .37† .67 .98** 15.61** 8.48** 9.80** 5.99* 10.29 9.05**
(.28) (.24) (.26) (.25) (.39) (.34) (3.08) (2.60) (3.03) (2.68) (6.04) (3.02)
[.34] [.25] [.25] [.26] [3.99] [3.41] [3.47] [3.32]
Kosovo .23 .44 3.30 4.58
(.23) (.35) (2.50) (2.90)
[.24] [.39] [3.38] [3.64]
Amount sent in TG1 .62** .60** .50** .68**
(.05) (.06) (.11) (.06)
[.06] [.06]
Percentage returned in TG1 .75** .73** .71** .75**
(.07) (.07) (.15) (.08)
[.07] [.07]
Individual controls No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 346 346 334 346 165 169 346 346 334 346 165 169
R2 .04 .36 .39 .01 .30 .58 .08 .36 .39 .02 .28 .62
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and robust standard errors clustered at the session level (37 clusters) are in brackets. Individual controls are gender,
marital status, education level, employment status, socioeconomic status (1 p poorest, 10 p richest), and risky lottery choice. All regressions include a constant term.
The means for the dependent variables are as follows: for the pooled sample, 5.92 for amount sent in TG2, .364 for amount sent TG2  TG1, 49.95 for percentage returned
in TG2, and 1.114 for percentage returned TG2  TG1; for Italy, 4.76 for amount sent in TG2 and 46.43 for percentage returned in TG2; and for Kosovo, 5.76 for
amount sent in TG2 and 53.3 for percentage returned in TG2. TG1 p first trust game; TG2 p second trust game; IES p impartial enforcement system.
† .p ! .15
 .p ! .1
* .p ! .05
** .p ! .01
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procity.17 We also explore whether individuals’ initial endowments of trust and
trustworthiness are sources of heterogeneity in treatment effects, but it appears
that the treatment equally influences individuals with high and low levels of
initial trust and trustworthiness.18 These effects are robust to the inclusion of
additional controls for individual characteristics19 and are also robust in Italy and
in Kosovo. The effects on both trust and trustworthiness are robust and significant
at the 1 percent level in Kosovo and at the 10 percent level in Italy. For each
behavior in the second trust game, the trust or trustworthiness specifications
displayed here control only for the corresponding behavior in the first trust game.
However, all results are robust to controlling for both trust and trustworthiness
behavior in the first game. Results are not only robust but also statistically and
economically more significant when country fixed effects are not included.20
The effect of contract enforcement institutions on trust and trustworthiness
is economically meaningful. Having traded under the IES treatment as opposed
to the PES treatment leads to amounts sent that are 12–18 percent higher and
percentages returned that are 20–31 percent higher, depending on whether we
control for individual characteristics and for behavior in the initial trust game.
The effect of institutions far outweighs that of any individual characteristics,
including the regional origin of our subject pool, as captured by our country
dummy. When we control for individual characteristics, the coefficients on the
institutional treatment are 1.6 and 2.1 times higher than the coefficient on the
17 Following a suggestion by an anonymous referee, we explored the effect of treatment on trust-
worthiness by decomposing trustworthiness into unconditional altruism and reciprocity, to get a
sense of whether the treatment enhances concern for others generally (for example, altruism) or
instead makes cooperation more conditional. Exploiting the fact that participants made their choices
as the receiver in the trust game using the strategy method, we first performed, for each individual,
a regression of the amount returned in the first (second) trust game on the amount received. We
then stored the parameters of these individual-level regressions: the constant term is a proxy of
individual unconditional altruism, while the estimated coefficient on the amount received variable
is a proxy of individual reciprocity. Finally, we ran regression 1 in Table B2 in the online appendix,
replacing the average share returned in the first (second) trust game with our measures of altruism
and reciprocity, to explore how our treatment affected these two components of the receivers’ behavior
in the trust game. Regression coefficients on our IES treatment indicator are positive in both re-
gressions, which suggests that impartial enforcement has a positive effect on both unconditional
altruism and reciprocity. This effect is statistically significant only for reciprocity.
18 To explore heterogeneous treatment effects based on subjects’ initial endowment of trust and
trustworthiness, we generate a variable equal to one if a subject’s level of trust (trustworthiness) in
the first trust game is greater than the median value of trust (trustworthiness) displayed by participants
in the experiment. We then run regression (1), adding an interaction term between our treatment
variable and the high-trust (high-trustworthiness) indicator. We find that the treatment effect on
trust and trustworthiness is not affected by individuals’ endowment of trust and trustworthiness,
respectively. The coefficient on the interaction term IES # high trust (high trustworthiness) is
generally positive (although not for Kosovo) and insignificant. The results of these regressions are
available on request.
19 Table B3 in the online appendix shows results from regression analysis of the individual char-
acteristics correlated with trust and trustworthiness in the initial trust game, for the full sample and
individual country samples. Our survey measure of risk aversion, based on a nonincentivized, hy-
pothetical choice between a safe lottery and a risky lottery, is not significant except for trustworthiness
in Kosovo.
20 The results of these robustness specifications are available on request.
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country dummy for Kosovo for trust and trustworthiness, respectively. In Italy,
the effect of impartial versus partial institutions on trustworthiness is equivalent
to three-fourths of the initial difference in trust between Milan and Palermo in
Sicily. In Kosovo, it is about three-fourths of the difference between Pristina,
the capital city, and Mitrovica, the scene of major tensions during the 1999 civil
war.
Columns 4 and 10 in Table 3 present the results of first-difference specifications
(eq. [2]) for trust and trustworthiness, respectively. The coefficient associated
with the IES treatment is still positive. It is only marginally significant for within-
subject differences in the amount sent, but its significance reaches the 5 percent
level for within-subject differences in the percentage returned. Results for in-
dividual country subsamples are similar to those discussed above. Assignment
to the IES treatment leads to positive and statistically significant individual in-
creases in trust and trustworthiness in the Kosovo subsample and increases in
only trustworthiness in the Italy subsample.21
We also explore how long lasting the treatment effect might be by testing its
sensitivity to cheating in the last round. Our analysis shows that the treatment
effect on trustworthiness is insensitive to what happens in the last rounds of
trading. Results of the empirical analysis are displayed in Table B5 in the online
appendix. The table shows the number of times each respondent has been cheated
by his or her partner in the last five rounds of treatment. On average, respondents
have been cheated 2.24 times during the last five rounds. As expected, respon-
dents in the PES treatment are cheated more often (2.68 times) than respondents
in the IES treatment (1.69 times). Columns 1–3 of Table B5 reproduce columns
7–9 of Table 3, in which trustworthiness is regressed on the treatment and on
a number of control variables to which the variable indicating having been
cheated in the last five rounds is added. Results are unchanged. In other words,
better-quality institutions lead to higher levels of trust, and the effect is robust
to the most recent experiences of noncooperation. Columns 4–6 of Table B5
take this test further by adding an interaction term between the treatment and
the number of times participants were cheated in the last five rounds. This
enables us to test whether the treatment has a differential effect as a function
of recent experiences of cheating. Again, the treatment effect is insensitive to
the most recent experiences of cheating. This insensitivity suggests that the treat-
ment effect of being exposed to good institutions may be long-lived.
Such a rapid change in trust observed after exposure to different institutions
in an experimental setting is intriguing in light of the literature on the slow-
changing nature of culture reviewed in Section 2 and is more in line with the
21 Conducting the analysis for macroregions (northern Italy, southern Italy, and Kosovo), although
extremely interesting, poses the challenge of statistical power. While our results are qualitatively
robust to the geographical split, regression coefficients for the two Italian macroregions generally
lose significance because of the reduced number of observations. The results suggest a stronger effect
of treatment in northern Italy than in southern Italy, but it is worth noting that this may be also
because of the larger number of participants from the north than from the south. The results of
these regressions are displayed in the online appendix.
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results of Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990). Kandori (1992) and Rand et al.
(2013) suggest a compelling interpretation of our results. Kandori (1992) shows
that when an agent can observe only her own history of trade, cooperation can
be sustained only by an equilibrium in which an experience of dishonesty incites
an individual to cheat all of her future partners, which unravels community
trust. In this context, better enforcement institutions can protect community
trust by preventing defection. Rand et al.’s (2013) social heuristics hypothesis
illustrates how experiences in one context of interactions can spill over to another.
Experiences of cooperation in the market game can shape subjects’ intuition,
predisposing them to cooperation in the trust game. In this interpretation, good-
quality institutions, by favoring cooperation over defection, foster cooperative
social norms, which are internalized and predispose agents to cooperate in other
environments, even when the institutional framework no longer has any power.
It should also be noted that we obtain our results in the specific context of
a very small economy composed of only 8–10 players, each of whom is expected
to meet all the other players at least once during the market game. Such op-
portunities for trade enable individuals to update prior assumptions about others
rapidly. Other studies have demonstrated how trade (Maystre et al. 2014) and
information, measured by access to phones or television (Fisman and Khanna
1999; Head and Mayer 2008), accelerate cultural change.
5.3. Quantifying the Effect of Noncooperation
Beyond the overall effect of our treatment, we are interested in the effect of
experiences of noncooperation (that is, cheating) in markets on trust and trust-
worthiness. This is indeed the main channel through which institutions are
expected to affect moral norms of cooperation in theoretical models a` la Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2008b) and Tabellini (2008). We use a Wald estimate
to quantify the effect of noncooperation on trust and trustworthiness. We first
compute the subjective probability that any other trader in the game is a non-
cooperator because of the individual frequency of having met a cheating partner
in the trading game relative to the number of participants in the session.22 We
then regress the frequency of cheating in the trading game on the institutional
treatment. Results are displayed in Table 4. Consistent with our experimental
design and with the descriptive evidence provided above, the IES treatment
reduces the frequency of cheating by 45 percent on average (significant at the
1 percent level).23 Wald estimates of the effect of a reduction in the frequency
of noncooperation in the trading game on trust and trustworthiness are presented
in Table 5.24 On average, a 1-percentage-point reduction in the probability of
noncooperation in the trading game increases amounts sent in the trust game
by 7–11 percent, depending on the specification. The corresponding increases
22 This probability is computed as (number of cheating partners)/(number of participants # trading
days in treatment round) # 100 for each individual i.
23 Results for individual country subsamples are in Table B6 in the online appendix.
24 The Wald estimators are ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆb p [E(TFIESp 1) E(TFPESp 1)]/[E(CheatedFIESp 1)Wald
, where T is trust and trustworthiness.ˆE(CheatedFPESp 1)]
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Table 4
Results of First-Stage Regressions of the Effect of Institutions on the Probability of a Partner Cheating
Pooled Sample Italy Kosovo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IES 1.64** 1.62** 1.63** 1.58** .90* .92* 2.34** 2.21**
(.24) (.27) (.24) (.27) (.38) (.38) (.41) (.42)
[.52] [.52] [.51] [.51]
Kosovo .53* .52 .50* .54
(.24) (.36) (.24) (.37)
[.53] [.57] [.54] [.57]
Amount sent in TG1 .03 .02 .04 .02
(.05) (.05) (.08) (.08)
[.06] [.06]
Percentage returned in TG1 .00 .01 .00 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
[.01] [.01]
Individual controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 346 334 347 334 165 165 169 169
R2 .13 .17 .13 .17 .16 .16 .28 .28
Fstatistic for an IES 46.18 37.18 47.47 35.23 5.65 5.86 32.88 28.19
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and robust standard errors clustered at the session level (37 clusters) are in brackets. Individual controls are gender,
marital status, education level, employment status, socioeconomic status (1 p poorest, 10 p richest), and risky lottery choice. All regressions include a constant term.
The means for the dependent variables are as follows: 3.54 for the pooled sample, 3.27 for Italy, and 3.80 for Kosovo. IES p impartial enforcement system; TG1 p first
trust game.
* .p ! .05
** .p ! .01
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Table 5
Second-Stage Regressions (Wald Estimates) of Trust as a Function of the Probability of a Partner Cheating





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability of partner cheating (instrumented by IES) .39* .44* .74 .42** 5.14** 6.19** 11.24 4.09**
(.16) (.17) (.50) (.15) (1.74) (2.14) (7.71) (1.52)
[.19] [.21] [2.72] [3.05]
Kosovo .43 .67 6.03* 7.91*
(.26) (.38) (2.76) (3.77)
[.33] [.41] [5.17] [5.46]
Amount sent in TG1 .61** .59** .52** .69**
(.06) (.06) (.11) (.07)
[.06] [.06]
Percentage returned in TG1 .74** .70** .73** .72**
(.08) (.08) (.19) (.09)
[.08] [.08]
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 346 334 165 169 346 334 165 169
R2 .25 .27 .01 .46 .18 .16 .26 .48
F-statistic 46.88 123.95 2.47 231.58 40.98 88.94 113.43 120.37
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and robust standard errors clustered at the session level (37 clusters) are in brackets. Individual controls are gender,
marital status, education level, employment status, socioeconomic status (1 p poorest, 10 p richest), and risky lottery choice. All regressions include a constant term.
The means for the dependent variables are as follows: for the amount sent, 5.92 for the pooled sample, 4.76 for Italy, and 5.76 for Kosovo; for the percentage returned,
49.94 for the pooled sample, 46.43 for Italy, and 53.3 for Kosovo. IES p impartial enforcement system; TG1 p first trust game.
 .p ! .1
* .p ! .05
** .p ! .01
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in trustworthiness are 13–19 percent. Again, all effects reported here are robust
to controlling for trust and trustworthiness behavior in the first trust game and
are robust and statistically more significant when omitting all controls, including
country fixed effects.25
These estimates can be interpreted as instrumental variables estimates only if
the reduction in noncooperation is the only mechanism through which the
treatment affects trust and trustworthiness. Alternative mechanisms may work
through the effect of treatment on the frequency of exchange, on profits, on
subjects’ own behavior, or through the combination of other-regarding prefer-
ences and other people’s earnings in the session. Variations in the volume of
trade are not consistently associated with variations in trust or trustworthiness.
The higher level of profits accruing to subjects under the IES treatment does
not significantly correlate with final levels of trust and trustworthiness. We find
no evidence that other-regarding preferences or aversion to inequality play any
significant role in the variation in trust and trustworthiness.26 Since we estimate
within-subject variation in trust and trustworthiness, we can also rule out that
the observed effect is due to any individual idiosyncrasy or to individual’s own
behavior either in the first trust game or from the market game dictating behavior
in the final trust game. Overall, we do not find any evidence that channels other
than noncooperation are at play, but we cannot entirely rule out the possibility
that other channels—for example, unintended and undetected framing in the
experiment—could be at play.
6. The Interaction between Culture and Enforcement Institutions
6.1. Empirical Specification
The second hypothesis that we empirically test deals with the relationship
between preexisting culture, particularly initial trust and trustworthiness, and
behaviors in the market under the different enforcement institutions. We estimate
the relationship
MBehav p a bD dT  cC fX  g  g   , (3)it i1 i i t it
where MBehavit captures individual market behavioral outcomes for individual
i (cheating, participation, and trading profit) on day of trading. Thetp [1, 10]
term is the experimental treatment, and C denotes coun-Dp {NoES, PES, IES}
try fixed effects. The term Ti1 denotes the behavior of agent i in the first trust
game. The term is an individual effect, and gt is a vector of variables for eachgi
trading day (time fixed effect). The error term is . We estimate this model init
the pooled sample as well as in the different treatment subsamples to test whether
trust or trustworthiness has a differential effect under different contract enforce-
ment institutions. Because the first trust game is played before the trading game,
25 Results for individual country subsamples are in Table B7 in the online appendix.
26 The results of specifications supporting the discussion here are available on request.
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even before the trading game instructions are administered, we can use behavioral
estimates of trust from the first trust game as measures of preexisting culture
without worrying about the reverse causal effect of trading behavior on trust.
Nevertheless, we suspect the presence of an omitted variable bias due to unob-
servable individual characteristics that could influence both behavior in the trust
game and behavior in the market game. In an attempt to control for such bias,
we control for individual characteristics such as age, gender, education level,
income, employment status, and risk aversion in Xi. The term d should still be
interpreted only as indicative of a correlation between trust and market behavior
in the market game.
6.2. Results
Results of the regressions investigating the role of preexisting culture, namely,
initial trust and trustworthiness, in market behavior and market efficiency are
displayed in Tables 6 and 7. All models are estimated with random effects.27
Cheating behavior is strongly curtailed in the IES treatment, while participation
is increased. Rates of cheating are lower and participation higher in the PES
treatment as well, compared with the baseline of the NoES treatment. In the
pooled regressions, initial trust and trustworthiness are negatively associated with
cheating (significant at the 1 percent level) but not with participation decisions
or profit. However, investigating the interplay between initial trust and trust-
worthiness and the different institutional treatments leads to a more complicated
picture.
Regressions for the NoES, PES, and IES treatments in Tables 6 and 7 estimate
the effect of initial trust or initial trustworthiness on each dependent variable
for each of the three treatments. Trust and trustworthiness deter cheating, but
only in the absence of impartial institutions. Under the IES treatment, neither
trust nor trustworthiness has any influence on cheating behavior. The interpre-
tation is that when contract enforcement institutions are present, economic
incentives have a salient effect on cheating behavior, akin to what has been
described by Fisman and Miguel (2007), Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001), and
McMillan and Woodruff (2000). Trust is not necessary, and it does not affect
market behavior. Similarly, neither trust nor trustworthiness is associated with
a market participation decision in the IES treatment. By contrast, initial trust
and initial trustworthiness are both significantly and negatively associated with
opportunistic behavior when either no institution or partial enforcement insti-
tutions only are present. Initial trust is associated with more participation in the
PES treatment but with lower participation in the NoES treatment, although the
27 A series of Hausman specification tests cannot reject the hypothesis that individual effects are
adequately modeled by random effects. The values of the Hausman statistics for the basic specification
in the pooled sample (in Tables 6 and 7) are 7.38, 1.12, and .05, respectively, when the dependent
variable is, respectively, cheat, stay out of trading, and profit.
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Table 6
Generalized Least Squares Random Effect Panel Estimation of Market Game Results: Initial Trust
Cheat Out Profit
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
PES .02 .03** 1.04**
(.02) (.01) (.27)
[.02] [.01] [.28]
IES .11** .05** 3.34**
(.02) (.01) (.36)
[.02] [.01] [.33]
Amount in sent TG1 .02** .02** .02** .01 .00 .01** .01 .00 .07 .04 .04 .15
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.07) (.08) (.11) (.11)
[.00] [.00] [.05]
Observations 6,679 3,339 1,860 1,480 6,680 3,340 1,860 1,480 6,679 3,339 1,860 1,480
Subjects 334 334 186 148 334 334 186 148 334 334 186 148
Wald x2 value 1,622 1,764 1,029 162 361.1 3,062 105.6 62.29 380.5 1,493 115.2 52.15
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and robust standard errors clustered at the session level (37 clusters) are in brackets. Individual controls are gender,
marital status, education level, employment status, and socioeconomic status (1 p poorest, 10 p richest). Trustworthiness is calculated as the amount returned as a
percentage, divided by 100 (that is, between 0 and 1). All regressions include a constant term. All regressions include country dummies, individual controls, and trading
day dummies. NoES p enforcement system with no institutions; PES p partial enforcement system; IES p impartial enforcement system; TG1 p first trust game.
 .p ! .1
** .p ! .01
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Table 7
Generalized Least Squares Random Effect Panel Estimation of Market Game Results: Initial Trustworthiness
Cheat Out Profit
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
PES .02 .03** 1.03**
(.02) (.01) (.27)
[.02] [.01] [.28]




from TG1 .20** .20** .30** .11 .02 .04 .05 .02 .17 .62 .84 .01
(.07) (.07) (.10) (.09) (.02) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.73) (.83) (1.35) (1.08)
[.06] [.07] [.12] [.09] [.03] [.03] [.04] [.03] [.70] [.85] [1.34] [1.19]
Observations 6,679 3,339 1,860 1,480 6,680 3,340 1,860 1,480 6,679 3,339 1,860 1,480
Subjects 334 334 186 148 334 334 186 148 334 334 186 148
Wald x2 value 1,713 3,471 841.2 160.18 360.7 3,102 103.2 60.17 379.5 1,654 116.3 51.82
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and robust standard errors clustered at the session level (37 clusters) are in brackets. Individual controls are gender,
marital status, education level, employment status, and socioeconomic status (1 p poorest, 10 p richest). Trustworthiness is calculated as the amount returned as a
percentage, divided by 100 (that is, between 0 and 1). All regressions include a constant term. All regressions include country dummies, individuals controls, and trading
day dummies. NoES p enforcement system with no institutions; PES p partial enforcement system; IES p impartial enforcement system; TG1 p first trust game.
** .p ! .01
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latter effect is only marginally significant (Table 7). There is no robust effect of
individual trust on individual profits.
Elements of culture other than trust and trustworthiness may play a role. In
Table 8, we provide results of specifications in which culture is proxied by
participants’ region of birth instead of by initial behavior in the trust game. We
reach similar conclusions. Culture is an important determinant of both oppor-
tunistic behavior and market participation decisions, but only in the absence of
impartial institutions. Cheating and opting out of trading are more prevalent
under the NoES treatment in southern Italy. As a result, profits are much lower
in southern Italy under the NoES and PES treatments. Cheating and opting out
of trading are more prevalent under the PES than under the NoES or IES
treatments in Kosovo. However, subjects display no significant differences in
cheating behavior, opting out, or profits under the IES treatment, regardless of
their region.
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications
We designed a framed field experiment both to identify the causal effects of
legal institutions on trust and trustworthiness and to shed light on how formal
institutional quality and cultural traits interact to sustain market exchange.28 We
obtained several results. The quality of legal institutions has a positive causal
effect on trust and trustworthiness, in a way that suggests that moral norms of
cooperative behavior can result as a positive by-product of improvement in
formal institutional quality. Better legal institutions enhance trust and trust-
worthiness by reducing the frequency with which subjects face opportunistic
agents when trading. This reduction enables individuals to revise upward their
beliefs about other people’s generalized trustworthiness, and it results in higher
levels of trust. Even more striking, agents not only trust more but also reciprocate
by being more trustworthy. This is important because generalized norms of trust
and trustworthiness play a crucial role in supporting exchange and cooperation
when contracts are incomplete or not easily enforceable. This finding contributes
to the literature that roots trust in the proper functioning of impartial institutions,
provides empirical support to models such as those of Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2008b) and Tabellini (2008), and complements existing nonexperi-
mental empirical evidence. Our controlled experiment not only establishes a
causal link between formal institutions and culture by ruling out the feedback
effect of culture on the design of institutions but also opens the black box of
institutions by focusing on one dimension of enforcement institutions: partiality
versus impartiality. Our empirical analysis quantifies the effect of impartial en-
28 Ethical reasons would prevent a study of this kind to be implemented as a randomized control
trial in the field. In economics, a long tradition of analyzing the effects of different market institutions
via controlled laboratory experiments provides support to the idea that subjects who are given real
incentives and face real choices, as they did in this setting, would exhibit behavior indicative of the
real behavior they would exhibit outside the laboratory (Smith 1994; Roth 2002).
Table 8
Generalized Least Squares Random Effect Panel Estimation of Market Game Results: Regional Origins
Cheat Out Profit
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
Pooled
Sample NoES PES IES
PES .02 .03** 1.02**
(.02) (.01) (.27)
[.02] [.01] [.28]
IES .11** .05** 3.32**
(.02) (.01) (.36)
[.02] [.01] [.34]
Sicily .10** .13** .08 .03 .02 .03* .01 .01 1.56** 2.11** 1.27 .25
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.46) (.59) (.69) (.71)
[.04] [.01] [.48]
Kosovo .04 .01 .16** .05 .02 .02 .06* .01 .36 .64 .34 .14
(.04) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.48) (.76) (.66) (.74)
[.04] [.59]
Observations 6,679 3,339 1,860 1,480 6,680 3,340 1,860 1,480 6,679 3,339 1,860 1,480
Subjects 334 334 186 148 334 334 186 148 334 334 186 148
Wald x2 value 1,695 2,677 921.1 159.37 360.8 6,816 104.5 60.86 401.8 2,733 121.6 52.12
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and robust standard errors clustered at the session level (37 clusters) are in brackets. The excluded regional
category is northern Italy. Individual controls are age, gender, marital status, education level, income, and employment status. All regressions include a constant
term. All regressions include individual controls and trading day dummies. NoES p enforcement system with no institutions; PESp partial enforcement system;
IES p impartial enforcement system.
 .p ! .1
* .p ! .05
** .p ! .01
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forcement institutions on trust through their influence on cooperation in a
contractible environment.
Another noteworthy finding is that preexisting trust and trustworthiness, or
more generally cultural origins, influence market participation and opportunistic
behavior in the absence of formal enforcement or when formal enforcement is
based on personalized networks, but they cease to matter once strong and im-
partial formal institutions are in place. This echoes previous findings in non-
experimental settings (Fisman and Miguel 2007; Grosjean 2014) and suggests
that cultural norms substitute for formal enforcement when the latter is weak.
Our study offers practical contributions for the reform of governance insti-
tutions and, in particular, contributes to the debate over the contribution of
informal institutions to public order and efficiency. Our study indicates, on an
optimistic note, that formal institutions can work not only to sustain economic
exchange but also to build trust, even in low-trust environments such as southern
Italy or even if current formal institutions are poorly developed, as in Kosovo.
However, in a real-world environment, the problem is how to generate such
positive institutional change. Some studies have shown how different modes of
institutional transplants—whether such institutions are imposed or adopted in
a democratic fashion—affect the likelihood of their success (Dal Bo, Foster, and
Putterman 2010). We aim to explore these issues in future research that will cast
light on the issue of the endogenous evolution of institutions and how culture
and preexisting norms may affect it.
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